Alaska Airlines worker wrote `panic' near log entry on search for parts

NOTE was made the day before the decision not to replace the jackscrew suspected in a crash. The meaning is unclear.

Copyright 2000, The Seattle Times Co.

One day before the decision not to replace a worn part suspected in the crash of Alaska Airlines Flight 261, an Alaska employee wrote the word "panic" next to a log entry about efforts to locate new parts.

The disclosure is contained in an interview the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted with John Liotine, the Alaska Airlines lead mechanic whose recommendation to replace the plane's jackscrew assembly was overridden by other mechanics.

A transcript of the April interview was obtained by The Seattle Times this week. The "panic" notation could have some bearing on the NTSB's investigation into whether the decision not to replace the jackscrew assembly was influenced by the desire to get the Boeing MD-83 back into service quickly in fall 1997.

That plane crashed a year and a half later as Flight 261 from Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, to San Francisco, killing all 88 people aboard. Investigators are examining whether excessive wear led to failure of the jackscrew, which tilts the horizontal stabilizer on the tail to control the plane's angle of flight.

Liotine, a mechanic at Alaska's Oakland maintenance facility, called for replacement of the jackscrew assembly on Sept. 27, 1997, after determining the part was too close to its legal wear limit.

He filled out a form that included a directive to order a new jackscrew assembly, a part that costs up to $60,000 and is usually obtained from an outside supplier.

Lance Seyer, a member of the NTSB investigation team, outlined for Liotine what records indicate happened next. Seyer represents the airline-mechanics union in the investigation.

On Sept. 28, Seyer said, another employee wrote about the need to order the part on a separate document called a shift turnover log. Seyer then told Liotine, "The next page we have is dated 9/29 grave shift; in the very top of the page it says continuing ordering parts, and then in parentheses the word `panic.' "

The plane, which was undergoing a heavy maintenance overhaul, was due to be returned to service the next day, Seyer noted.

Referring to the word "panic," Seyer asked, "Would that be something that is normally in there the day before the check is supposed to go out of the hangar?"

"It shouldn't be normally in there - that should be something you definitely have control over," Liotine responded.

Still unresolved is whether the "panic" entry specifically referred to the jackscrew assembly because of the plural use of the term "parts" on the Sept. 29 log.

Alaska officials declined comment, citing the NTSB probe. A company source who requested anonymity said it was unclear what parts the entry refers to, while acknowledging that the jackscrew could have been one of them.

The entry dealt with the MD-83 overhaul and came at the top of the page after prior reference to the need to order a jackscrew, the source said.

Mechanics scratched out Liotine's directive to replace the jackscrew assembly Sept. 30 and conducted a new wear test that found the part to be well within its limit. The plane was ultimately released Oct. 2 and crashed 28 months later.

The NTSB has been trying to determine if the mechanics involved in the second test acted because they couldn't find a replacement part and wanted to get the plane back into service. The mechanics have denied any wrongdoing, saying they followed proper procedures.

Ronald Hensel, a lead mechanic who played a key role in overturning Liotine's directive, signed the shift log containing the word "panic," Liotine told Alaska pilot David Crawley, another member of the investigation team, after looking at the log.

Hensel's attorney, Chris Arguedas of Emeryville, Calif., declined comment except to say she was not concerned about the "panic" entry.

The FBI is also investigating the crash, and one of its agents participated in the April interview with Liotine.

The interview was headed by Frank McGill, an NTSB investigator. In addition to Seyer and Crawley, representatives of Alaska Airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration also participated.

During the 2 1/2-hour session, Liotine responded to specific questions about the jackscrew examination and pointed to general problems in Alaska's maintenance operations.

Liotine was a whistle-blower 16 months before the crash, telling federal investigators that Alaska employees were falsifying maintenance records. He said he wasn't aware of his role in the 1997 test until the NTSB investigators showed him the paperwork. He then recalled details as he examined the records.

Focusing on a central question, McGill asked Liotine why he ordered replacement of the part if it was within limits. Liotine replied that "something didn't seem right" because the jackscrew assembly was showing a lot of wear on a relatively young plane.

"And that's compared against aircraft that are three times its age," he added.

McGill also referred to the date Liotine wrote up the replacement order and noted it took about three days for it to be scratched out. "This thing was written on the 27th, which was a Saturday. That's a long time to be sitting around."

"Yes, it is, I would agree," Liotine responded, adding he was never told his directive had been reversed.

Liotine also was informed by the investigators that the jackscrew assembly was lubricated between the first wear test and the retest. Asked if that could affect a test measured in thousandths of inches, Liotine replied: "You would measure less; that grease is going to effectively create a boundary layer between the two surfaces. How many thousandths that would be, perhaps our Boeing engineer can specifically figure that out. I think it would correspond to temperature."

Liotine's theory has been disputed by representatives of the jackscrew maker, who say grease has been shown to randomly cause higher and lower readings, said a federal law-enforcement source who requested anonymity. But grease apparently can skew the results, the source said.

After the crash, Alaska changed its procedures to require that the jackscrew assembly be wiped clean before wear tests.

Some of the most pointed questions put to Liotine came from Crawley, representing the pilots' union. It was Crawley who, the next month, wrote a letter to a top Alaska official questioning the carrier's approach to safety and maintenance.

Crawley asked Liotine if replacing the jackscrew would have delayed the release of the plane, saying, "you kind of hinted that it was the big push at the end and it was going to delay the airplane getting out of there but didn't really say that. . . ."

"It would delay the aircraft," Liotine responded. ". . . Undoubtedly that would have delayed the aircraft. I don't know that we ever acquired that part."

Crawley later informed Liotine that investigators could find no evidence that the part was ever ordered.

"That's heavy," Liotine said.

Crawley further inquired about why the assembly wasn't put on a watch, to check it periodically before the next major overhaul.

Liotine said there was a "stigma" against doing that.

"So that was discouraged?" Crawley asked.

"Yes," Liotine answered.

Liotine said he considered it "strange" that a check wasn't put on the assembly for every 500 or 1,000 hours "because it seems like this thing's going to be out of limits in short order."

Asked how reliable the wear test is, Liotine said, "I would say that depends mostly on the operator, but done properly I would say it's extremely reliable."

Liotine said it would difficult to measure more wear than actually exists, but possible to find less wear.

"Do you know of any way to perform the . . . check to intentionally measure at a lower reading?" McGill asked.

Liotine said a dial indicator used to read the measurement could be set at the wrong angle.

Steve Miletich's phone message number is 206-464-3302.