The Day Somalia Fell Apart - Again -- June 5 Incident Started Setback

MOGADISHU, Somalia - Something happened on June 5.

It's not entirely clear what it was, but everyone agrees that it changed in an instant the nature of life in Mogadishu, the dynamics of the U.N. operation here, and led to this week's ugliness.

"Until June 5, people were going to the beach," U.S. Capt. Jonathan Dahms said. "June 5 changed the whole complexion of the operation."

Relief workers echo that feeling, noting that up until then Somalia was recovering.

WHO ATTACKED WHOM?

To hear U.N. military officials tell it, it was on June 5 that Pakistani U.N. troops were on a routine weapons search at the national radio station, long-controlled by Mohamed Farrah Aidid's faction and used by him for a steady stream of pro-Aidid, anti-U.N. propaganda.

On their way out, U.N. military officials say, the Pakistanis were ambushed by Aidid's militia. Later, at a nearby feeding kitchen guarded by Pakistani troops, gunmen burst from behind women and children and began shooting down the Pakistanis.

Spokesmen for Aidid contend that the Pakistanis had attacked the radio station, and that Aidid's troops were merely defending themselves and their country from "interference in our internal affairs."

Mahmoud Sahnoun, the former Algerian diplomat who was in charge of U.N. operations here before a falling-out last year with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, was in Washington at the time. But, he said, rumors had reached him before June 5 that U.N. troops would try to take control of the radio station from Aidid.

"I knew the Somalis had some information that the U.N. wanted to destroy the radio station," he said.

Aidid had never kept secret his disdain for the United Nations. In spring of last year he was organizing demonstrations demanding that the U.N. get out. He was convinced, he said, that the U.N. had decided to side with his crosstown rival, Ali Mahdi. Aidid and his supporters believe, probably with justification, that to them an Ali Mahdi government would mean political eclipse and financial ruin, perhaps even death.

So there was little surprise when Aidid opposed U.N. operations. But the belligerence and the violence of his opposition, coming so quickly after the U.N. had taken command from the United States in May, surprised many in Mogadishu and led to a rapid reassessment of how to deal with Aidid.

Whatever actually happened, the incident resulted in the death of 26 Pakistani troops. An anguished and emotional U.N. Security Council met and ordered its Mogadishu commander, retired U.S. Admiral Jonathan Howe, to arrest and prosecute whoever was responsible. Suspicion immediately fell on Aidid.

"The operation really got off track in June," said Terrence Lyons, a researcher for the Washington-based Brookings Institution who specializes in African affairs. "Getting into a kind of personalized one-on-one against Aidid, putting a price on his head, built Aidid up into a more powerful figure than was necessary. Now, I think they're really in a jam."

But once the situation has gotten to the point where U.N. troops were being massacred, what else could be done? "I don't know," Lyons said. "Once that attack was done, it's hard to ignore. If you just allow your peacekeepers to be knocked off, well, all I can say is those people faced some real tough decisions in June."

FROM BAD TO WORSE

The situation eroded rapidly after June 5:

Aidid gets time to escape. On June 17, Howe announced that an investigation showed Aidid was responsible for the June 5 attack. An arrest warrant had been issued for Aidid, Howe said.

However, military officials complain, they were not given a chance to arrest Aidid before Howe's announcement was made. As a result, Aidid had plenty of time to slip out of his compound and go into hiding, where he has remained to this day.

This particular, puzzling blunder has never been adequately explained by U.N. officials.

Somalis side with Aidid. Public opinion among many ordinary Somalis - even those who oppose Aidid - began to swing in Aidid's direction, according to several Mogadishu residents.

"People began to see the U.N. as a warring faction that is inside Somalia," said Mohamed Issa Mohamed, a local journalist. "They saw foreigners attacking Somalis, killing them. Even those who hate Aidid could not support such a thing."

Reward vs. reward. U.N. officials also thought that by offering a $25,000 cash reward for Aidid they could convince his Somali rivals to turn him in. But the reward became a joke for Somalis, who offered their own "reward" for Howe's arrest.

The clan system. U.S. and U.N. officials also said - wrongly, so far - that Aidid's support had eroded within the Habr Gedir. Analysts who know Somalia well, including former diplomats in Mogadishu, academics and Somalis themselves, say that showed how badly U.N. officials misunderstood the nature of the Somali clan system.

U.S. and U.N. officials have also underestimated the number of militiamen Aidid can count on.

In the early stages of the conflict, U.S. officials openly estimated that Aidid could count on only about 200 to 300 armed guerrilla fighters and claimed most of them fought for him only because he paid them and kept them well supplied with the narcotic leaf khat.

After each engagement, Aidid's forces suffered heavy losses but managed to come back even stronger for the next fight. Finally, U.S. military officials have been forced to concede that Aidid may be getting new recruits from the Somali countryside.